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The Dreamworld of New Yugoslav Culture and the Logic of Cold War Binaries  
 
Sabina Mihelj 
 
‘We are following our own path into socialism, and we will not allow anyone, neither 
those in the East nor those in the West, to make us stray away from this path’.1 This 
statement, taken from a speech delivered by the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito at 
the plenary session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1954, 
encapsulates what was then the guiding ideological principle of the Yugoslav 
federation. It also serves as an apposite starting point for discussing the theoretical 
and methodological limitations of thinking about the Cold War in terms of a rigid 
East-West divide. A narrative structured around a black-and-white conflict between 
two ideologically opposed blocks is obviously ill-suited to account for the history of 
post-World War II Yugoslavia. In the years that followed the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, 
the Yugoslav political leadership embraced a new set of political and economic 
principles, centered on the ideal of ‘worker’s self-management’ and premised on a 
rejection of ‘Soviet’ or ‘Stalinist’ models and a rereading of the classics of Marxism-
Leninism.
2
 In line with this ideological reorientation, the Party was expected to 
abandon its role as the ‘commander’ and ‘direct operative manager’ of social, state 
and economic life, and instead dedicate itself to the ‘political and ideological work in 
educating the masses’.3 Ensuing changes in the Yugoslav foreign policy, 
characterized by the country’s prominent involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement, 
followed a similar logic, and can be seen as a balancing act aimed at eschewing the 
logic of bloc politics.
4
  
 
Shifts in the realm of cultural policies were based on the same template.
5
 Already in 
1949, Yugoslav communist authorities came to the conclusion that the old approach, 
aimed at changing popular consciousness and instituting new cultural values with the 
help of ‘administrative means’, was misguided, and had to be replaced with a less 
intrusive and prescriptive approach to culture, more amenable to ideological 
pluralism.
6
 The Departments of Agitprop and Propaganda were formally abolished in 
1952, socialist realism was no longer treated as the only ideologically acceptable 
paradigm, and Yugoslavia’s museums, cinemas, concert halls and bookshops opened 
their doors to cultural imports from the West. By the mid-1950s, the number of films 
imported from the United States was over five times higher than in 1949, while the 
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number of Soviet films decreased rapidly.
7
 In 1952, the daily newspaper Politika 
started publishing Donald Duck comics, and re-launched its popular weekly comic 
magazine Politikin Zabavnik.
8
 At the same time, the official attitudes towards jazz and 
popular music in general softened as well, though a measure of suspicion remained.
9
 
These changes were accompanied by a new understanding of Yugoslav identity and 
culture, based on the idea of Yugoslavia as a meeting point of two cultural worlds, 
which presumably gave rise to a unique cultural hybrid containing elements drawn 
from both the East and the West.  
 
It is tempting to adopt the categories and phrases used by Yugoslav leaders and policy 
makers themselves and describe the post-1948 Yugoslav economy, politics and 
culture in ways they themselves often did, namely as a distinctive blend of West and 
East, market principles and state control, entertainment and education. Yet is such an 
approach really capable of overcoming the limitations of Cold War binaries? Not 
quite. Narrating the history of Tito’s Yugoslavia in terms of a separate path into 
socialism would mean missing the active role of official discourse in molding and 
appropriating Yugoslav realities, and obscuring those of their features that may not 
quite fit the self-congratulatory image of Yugoslav uniqueness. While the LCY did 
indeed give up its monopoly over the political decision-making process, it never 
abandoned its monopoly over political organization, and retained control over the 
appointment of key personnel in the country’s leading mass organization, the trade 
unions, municipal governments and elsewhere.
10
 In the realm of economic policy, the 
state retained a powerful role, and although the successive waves of economic 
reforms did bring significant changes that helped increase the general well-being of 
Yugoslav citizens, the Yugoslav system effectively remained socialist in nature, and 
self-management was never fully implemented in practice.
11
 Changes in the realm of 
culture were possibly more far-reaching, yet it is important to keep in mind that 
cultural experimentation was punctuated by periodic purges of cultural institutions, 
closing down of journals and persecutions.
12
 Neither it is possible to sustain the 
argument that the Yugoslav experiment was entirely unique in the socialist East. 
Changes similar to those recorded in Yugoslavia were taking place elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself, especially in the new cultural climate 
of the Thaw,
13
 making differences between Yugoslavia and the rest of the communist 
world more a matter of degree than of any profound, qualitative differences. Or, to put 
it differently: the dreamworld of socialist Yugoslavia after 1948 may well have been 
premised on the notion of Yugoslav uniqueness, but whether the reality of socialist 
Yugoslavia was indeed so unique is disputable.  
 
How, then, should we approach the East-West binary and the associated categories 
and distinctions underpinning the divided dreamworlds of Cold War culture, 
including those that were – as the Yugoslav one after 1948 – aimed at escaping the 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., p. 449. 
8
 Ibid., pp. 447-9. 
9
 Luković, op.cit., pp. 10-20. 
10
 Rusinow, op.cit., pp. 73-4. 
11
 Milica Uvalić, Investment and Property Rights in Yugoslavia: The Long Transition to a Market 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
12
 Gabrič, op.cit.; Marković, op. cit., 323-55. 
13
 E.g. Susan Reid and David Crowley, eds., Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in 
Post-war Eastern Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000). 
This is a pre-print version. Final version published in: Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-
Smith and Joes Segal 2012 (eds.) Divided Dreamworlds: The Cultural Cold War in 
East and West, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
logic of block politics? One fruitful way of inquiry is to delve into the negotiations 
and adaptations of these dreamworlds in the realm of everyday life, and explore those 
aspects of cultural practices and forms that eschew the neat distinctions of official 
discourse and policies. Yet if pursued on its own, this route of exploration risks 
getting caught in the popular narratives of repression and resistance, which are 
evidently in tune with contemporary sensibilities and recollections of the socialist 
past, but fail to capture the logic of Cold War dreamscapes and their role in really 
existing socialism. To avoid this, we need to complement this approach with another 
line of inquiry – one pursued also in this chapter – which involves treating Cold War 
categories and distinctions as objects of analysis in their own right, examining their 
discursive logic and uses in particular social contexts, and their relationship with the 
fluid nature of cultural processes, events and products they are meant to describe. This 
method of inquiry enables us to move beyond the simple acknowledgement of the 
mismatch between official proclamations and everyday practices, and gain a closer 
insight into the nature of this mismatch, its epistemic effects and links with 
relationships of power and social divisions. Gaining such insight is of vital 
importance if we are to fully appreciate the role of binary thinking during the Cold 
War and overcome its legacies in contemporary debates about the period.  
 
Yugoslav culture and early Cold War binaries in the Yugoslav northeast  
 
The rest of this chapter applies this analytical approach to a case study, namely the 
journalistic discourse about culture in the north-western part of Yugoslavia, 
encompassing the region bordering Italy and the eastern side of the upper Adriatic 
coast. The proximity of Italy, the bilingualism of the local population, and the 
presence of ethnic minorities on both sides – Italians in Yugoslavia and Slovenians in 
Italy – were a constant source of inter-ethnic tensions, suspicions and even violence,14 
but also encouraged cross-border exchanges even at the height of Cold War tensions, 
and obstructed the processes of cultural homogenization and nation-building on each 
side of the border. Italian radio and later television channels were immensely popular 
with the local Yugoslav audiences, and from the mid-1950s onwards, when special 
passports were introduced for local residents, shopping trips and visits to friends and 
family members in Italy became increasingly common.
15
 At the same time, many 
Italians and Slovenian minority members living in Italy became regular customers of 
local Slovenian and Croatian restaurants and petrol stations, followed radio and 
television programs broadcast from Yugoslavia, and also formed a substantial 
proportion of foreign tourists visiting the Yugoslav coastal resorts.   
 
To examine the key traits of the early Cold War discourse about culture in the shifting 
ideological and cultural landscape of the region, this chapter focuses on the immediate 
post-World War II period up to 1948, when Yugoslav cultural forms and practices 
were organized, both institutionally and discursively, in much the same way as their 
equivalents in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in communist Eastern Europe. The 
media covered in the analysis include all the major Croatian and Slovenian 
newspapers published in the north-western part of the federation (Riječki list/ Novi 
list, Glas Istre, Primorske novice), the pro-Yugoslav Slovenian minority newspaper 
                                                 
14
 Marina Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confline orientale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), pp.168-81. 
15
 Jože Šušmelj, ‘Videmski sporazum’, in Jože Pirjevec, Gorazd Bajc and Borut Klabjan, eds., Vojna in 
mir na Primorskem (Koper: Založba Annales, 2005) pp. 307-322. 
This is a pre-print version. Final version published in: Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-
Smith and Joes Segal 2012 (eds.) Divided Dreamworlds: The Cultural Cold War in 
East and West, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
issued in Trieste (Primorski Dnevnik), and one Italian minority newspaper (La Voce 
del Popolo). It is important to clarify the limitations imposed by the nature of primary 
sources used. Especially in the early post-war years, the press largely reflected official 
views and did not exert an independent influence on cultural processes.
16
 This was 
also a period when literacy rates were relatively low and local resistance to 
communist policies fairly widespread. Therefore, it may well be that the framing of 
culture promoted by the press was largely ignored by the wider population. Accepting 
this proposition, however, would mean confusing influence with approval; while the 
socialist Yugoslav press certainly cannot be taken as an accurate expression of public 
culture as a whole, it nevertheless played a major role in delineating the boundaries of 
what was publicly acceptable, and imposing ‘a structure of thinking’ even among 
those who did not support the regime.
17
 It is also worth keeping in mind that the Cold 
War, similarly as all other twentieth century wars, was a truly mass phenomenon. 
Fought in an era when power was exercised in the name of the masses, wars required 
extensive mobilization of civilians into army troops and depended on mass support – 
or at least an illusion of mass support – among citizens-voters who formed part of the 
‘home front’ and participated in the battle as distant spectators. As such, total wars 
could not exist without the mass media, which forged symbolic bonds between the 
soldiers at the front and the population at home, providing both with images of 
triumphant self-assertion and of the threatening, devious acts of the enemy.
18
 The 
cultural contest that formed part of the Cold War was no different in this respect, 
which makes the examination of journalistic framings of culture vitally important to 
its understanding.   
 
Throughout the period examined in this chapter, the border between Italy and 
Yugoslavia remained in flux. As the Cold War rivalry began to take shape, the 
territorial dispute between the two neighboring states assumed a strategically 
important geopolitical role. Consequently, the fate of the port city of Trieste and the 
surrounding area became a burning issue not only for Italy and Yugoslavia, but also 
for ‘The Big Four’ – the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France – who took over the task of finding a solution to the ‘Trieste problem’.19 
Following the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947, an interim solution was 
implemented, which included the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste, an 
unusual political formation comprising Trieste and its immediate surroundings. The 
territory was divided into two zones, one controlled by the Allied Military 
Government and the other by the Yugoslav army. The legitimacy of this solution 
remained disputed, and much of the local population, in particular in Trieste, 
continued to live in a state of perpetual mass mobilization.
20
 The inclusion of much of 
the Istrian peninsula into communist Yugoslavia also prompted yet another wave of 
mass migration; in total, almost half of the Italian population living in these 
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territories, along with a number of anti-communist Slovenians and Croatians, left for 
Italy and other countries, and were replaced by immigrants from other parts of 
Yugoslavia.
21
   
 
Operating in this volatile context, marked by the intensification of the global 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union., the press was involved 
in a constant ideological battle. Along with the rest of the Yugoslav media, it formed 
part and parcel of a complex apparatus for cultural change, modeled on the one 
established in the Soviet Union and aimed at fostering the rise of a new, socialist 
Yugoslav culture.
22
 Although the Yugoslav press was legally free and not owned 
directly by the state or the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), this apparatus 
nevertheless provided ample opportunities for the CPY to filter undesirable content 
and use the press as a collective agitator and propagandist. The Departments of 
Agitprop and Propaganda were regularly sending out detailed instructions on the most 
desirable cultural content, supplying the newspapers with ready-made articles, 
monitoring the content of newspapers for ideological purity, and giving 
recommendations about editorial board membership.
23
 The CPY also used its 
influence over the legislative, judicial and executive bodies to pass and enforce 
legislation favorable to the Communist Party. For example, although the 1945 Law on 
the Press guaranteed free expression of opinion, the Criminal Law at the same time 
allowed for various more or less direct ways of censorship.
24
 This legislative 
framework enabled the communist officials to issue publishing permits only to ‘loyal’ 
publishers, boost the circulation of party-sponsored newspapers by allocating press 
subsidies, and prevent the spreading of un-orthodox views by limiting the use of 
paper, denying access to printing facilities, delaying various bureaucratic procedures, 
and even confiscating the printing presses.
25
 Finally, most major newspapers were 
founded by the Peoples’ Front of Yugoslavia, a mass organizations that shared CPY’s 
ideological convictions.  
 
Ideologically, the normative views about Yugoslav culture promoted by the CPY in 
this period were rooted in Marxist-Leninist perceptions of modernity and society, 
centered on the notion of culture as a tool of progress and elevation of the working 
classes. Three closely intertwined features of these normative framing were 
particularly prominent in the analyzed newspaper coverage: (a) the understanding of 
culture as a tool of progress and education; (b) the emphasis on a distinctly socialist 
nature of progress that culture was expected to foster, (c) the conviction that 
ideological content of culture was more important than its aesthetic form, and (d) the 
privileging of mass over elite culture. On every account, the ‘new Yugoslav culture’ 
was construed as the exact opposite of ‘bourgeois’ culture of the pre-war past, which 
also allegedly continued to flourish in the capitalist West. The cosmology drawn by 
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the media was one of clear divisions and black-and-white contrasts, which neither 
acknowledged nor tolerated any shades of grey.  
 
Culture as a tool of progress. To start with, the new Yugoslav culture was seen as an 
integral instrument of progress, and was expected to foster the cultural, ideological 
and civilisational ‘elevation’ of the Yugoslav population by cultivating its cultural 
awareness and sensibility, inculcating the ability to appreciate and understand art, as 
well as stimulating the acquisition of technical and physical skills – in other words, to 
encourage Bildung in the original German sense of the word. For instance, in one 
article, government investment into the renovation of a ‘home of the people’ [narodni 
in one of the Istrian villages – a building that would typically serve as a venue for 
local gatherings, literacy classes and various other activities – was presented as 
evidence of government support for ‘raising the cultural level’ of the population.26 In 
a similar vein, a report summarizing the plan of work of the theatre in Rijeka was 
inviting workers to ‘treat theatre as their home’, arguing that this would ‘help in their 
general and cultural elevation and raise the level of artistic education’.27 As with other 
elements of the journalistic framing of Yugoslav culture in this period, the belief in 
culture-induced ‘elevation’ was shared by the Soviet system of cultural values, as 
established in the post-revolutionary period.
28
 
 
As the above-quoted examples suggest, the provision of cultural activities and 
infrastructure that would foster the elevation of the whole population was seen as a 
key task of local cultural institutions as well as government authorities. In this sense, 
the notion of culture as an instrument of progress was used for the purpose of 
institutional self-legitimation, including the self-legitimation of the ruling communist 
authorities themselves. Yet the duty to foster the development of new Yugoslav 
culture was not in the exclusive domain of the state and the party. Quite to the 
contrary, organizations and individuals at virtually all levels of society were expected 
to contribute to this endeavor. These expectations were clearly visible in the coverage 
of mobilizational activities designed to boost Yugoslav productivity, including short 
periods of intensive industrial production known as ‘shockwork’ and various 
competitions between local factories, schools, and other organizations. These 
activities were based on the Russian Stakhanovite movement and had their precedents 
in 1930s Soviet Union.
29
 Announcements and journalistic reports of these 
mobilizational events were a common sight in the local media, and often received a 
prominent position on the first few pages of the newspapers. As one article explained, 
cultural activities formed an integral part of the process of ‘ideological elevation’, 
which was designed to accelerate the industrialization of the country and help 
construct the ‘new Yugoslavia’. Given the importance of culture to Yugoslav 
development, the author was concerned about the lack of cultural events 
accompanying mobilizational activities, and appealed to the local labor union 
organizations to invest more effort in promoting education and literacy among the 
population. This example shows how the notion of culture as an instrument of 
progress served not only as a discursive tool of power legitimation, but also as an 
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instrument of normative assessment, used to distinguish between the good, 
commendable aspects of cultural processes and events, and the less worthy ones.  
 
Closely linked to these normative ideas was the treatment of cultural skills and 
artifacts as an indicator of the country’s level of civilization and progress. Attitudes to 
literacy are a case in point. High levels of illiteracy, common especially among the 
rural population, were seen as major markers of cultural and civilisational 
underdevelopment, ‘suffocating the free labor force and enthusiasm for work among 
our people’ and thereby hindering the progress of villages as well as the realization of 
the five year plan.
30
 Several articles were urging the local population and in particular 
the Yugoslav youth and women to attend literacy classes. As one article insisted, 
illiteracy should be erased from Tito’s Yugoslavia, ‘since it is only in this way that we 
will be able to build the country and make it cultured and progressive’.31 Or, as one 
Yugoslav citizen explained in a letter he wrote as part of his literacy training: ‘The 
war is over, but we need to continue with our struggle against illiteracy’.32 Literacy, in 
other words, was believed to constitute a core element of Yugoslavia’s development, 
and diminishing illiteracy rates served as material proof of the country’s progress.  
 
Apart from providing the normative basis for assessing the level and quality of 
Yugoslav culture from within, the understanding of culture as a means of progress 
also functioned as a marker of Yugoslav identity in relation to its various external 
others, be they historical or contemporary. In this sense, the notion of culture as a tool 
of development was used to position the new Yugoslav culture geo-culturally, in 
relation to the East and the West, as well as historically, in relation to the ‘old’ culture 
of the pre-war decades. Articles promoting ‘cultural elevation’ routinely referred to 
the neighboring country and the Fascist rule in particular as the party responsible for 
the cultural ‘backwardness’ of the local population. An article reporting on a cultural 
youth festival in Buje thus contrasted the flourishing cultural life of the village in the 
new Yugoslavia with the cultural wasteland of pre-war decades, when the local 
population ‘was left without its own language, without books and education and 
without opportunities for cultural development’.33 The same message was repeated in 
a report summarizing the achievements of the new administration in one of the 
localities in Istria, where Fascism was blamed for the obstacles faced by the new 
administration, in particular for the low literacy rates and education among locals.
34
  
 
Such sharp contrasts between the past and the present, ‘us’ and ‘them’, obscured 
fundamental continuities with the pre-war past, as well as similarities with cultural 
policies and practices on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The idea of culture as a 
tool and marker of development was widely spread across nineteenth-century Europe 
and constituted one of the guiding principles of the rise of mass literacy and the 
numerous campaigns for compulsory education, all of which were, much as the 
campaigns for literacy documented in Yugoslav newspapers, couched in the language 
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of progress.
35
 The practice of viewing the acquisition of cultural skills as an index of 
progress has its roots in the same period, and coincided with the rise of modern states 
and mass democracy that demanded authorities to legitimize their power by, among 
other things, providing the population with means of cultural progress.
36
 In the post-
war years, the efforts to enlist culture in the struggle against backwardness were 
common across the east East-West divide, and also underpinned much of the US 
research on modernization and development in the Middle East and Latin America.
37
 
The close link between culture and progress was thus something that was neither 
particularly new nor unique to the socialist East, but instead constitutes on of the key 
features that attest the shared roots of the understanding of culture on both sides of the 
Cold War divide.  
 
Culture as an instrument of socialist modernization. While helping raise the general 
civilisational level of the local population, cultural activities in the new Yugoslavia 
were also meant to fulfill more specifically socialist goals. To this end, Yugoslavia 
needed a culture that was not aimed solely at entertainment, but was dedicated 
primarily to the cultivation of specifically socialist values and sensibilities. An 
unsigned article published in the Italian minority daily thus criticized the local labor 
unions for putting too much emphasis on entertainment and staging too many ‘light’ 
plays and comedies, and for stuffing local libraries with sentimental novels instead of 
providing cultural activities capable of promoting socialist principles and helping 
recruit volunteers for shockwork and the youth labor brigades.
38
 Such popular 
entertainment, it was argued, will instill idleness and promote worldly pleasures 
instead of mobilizing the population for the construction of socialism. Modern dance 
and music, including boogie-woogie, jazz and swing, popularized by Allied soldiers 
in neighboring Italy
39
 and trickling through the Free Territory of Trieste and across 
the border into Yugoslavia, were particularly often coming under attack. In one 
article, jazz was described as ‘hysterical’,40 while another suggested that ‘boogie-
woogie ‘has nothing to do with culture’.41 These anxieties were shared by Soviet 
Party officials, who were constantly concerned about the vulnerability of the Russian 
people to various cultural seductions and deviations orchestrated by the capitalist 
world.
42
 To be sure, both leisure and entertainment were considered legitimate and 
necessary, yet the key task of Yugoslav cultural manifestations lay elsewhere: ‘they 
should inculcate seriousness of life needed for the construction of the new state, they 
should teach people to take pride in work, to take pride in making a contribution to 
the creation of a common future’.43 Another article was similarly prescriptive, and 
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argued that more should be done to set up cultural events aimed at promoting people’s 
participation in agricultural and other activities laid out in the five year plan.
44
  
 
The emphasis on the educational and mobilizational role of culture also played a key 
role in the selection of various fictional and semi-fictional cultural forms published in 
the same newspapers. For instance, the protagonists of short stories, serialized novels 
and comic dialogues were most often model socialist workers or peasants, involved in 
a revolutionary battle or in heroic re-building of their war-torn society. One such 
serialized novel was set in the context of the October Revolution,
45
 while another 
featured Istria peasants reminiscing about their resistance activities during World War 
II, and proudly talking about the freedom brought to them by the new Yugoslav rule.
46
 
As a rule, Western politicians featuring in such novels or short stories were portrayed 
in a negative light: in one case, former US president Herbert Hoover was described as 
a ‘warmonger’, while another involved a mocking portrayal of Harry Truman.47 The 
comic dialogues between Franina and Jurina, appearing on the pages of the Croatian 
language newspaper Glas Istre, offer another example. The protagonists of these 
dialogues were always the same: two Istrian peasants talking in the local dialect, one 
somewhat more ignorant than the other and usually a target for mild ridicule as well 
as education. In each episode of the dialogue, the better-informed protagonist would 
talk to his friend about an important event or issue and criticize him for knowing so 
little about it. In all cases, the events and issues discussed were taken from the Party’s 
agenda for that week or day, and included for instance the five year plan and the 
Yugoslav state budget, the building of the new railway system, and the 30th 
anniversary of the October Revolution.
48
  
 
As with the notion of culture as a tool of progress, the emphasis on education-
centered culture as an instrument of socialist Yugoslav modernization can easily lead 
us to miss important similarities with attitudes and process in the West as well as links 
with long-term developments on both sides of the Cold War divide. To start with, 
disdain for popular entertainment was certainly not unique to the socialist East. The 
popularity of American movies, music, and dances among young East and West 
Germans in the early 1950s provoked strikingly similar responses in both Germanies, 
causing anxiety over the oversexualization of women and feminization of men 
purportedly stimulated by these cultural forms.
49
 Reactions among contemporaries in 
neighbouring Italy were often rather similar, though negative attitudes to popular 
entertainment were widespread primarily among supporters of the Communist Party, 
while Catholic circles quickly became rather adept at appropriating popular cultural 
forms to their own benefit.
50
 Across Western Europe, and in fact even in the 
American ‘empire of fun’ itself, new forms of entertainment were provoking mixed 
reactions, which often varied with age, gender, race and socioeconomic background, 
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and did not coincide with territorial and cultural boundaries. Neither was this mixture 
of suspicion and enthusiasm limited to the post-World War II period.
51
 For instance, 
the notion that cultural activities should be dedicated primarily to educational ends 
was common among British socialists already in the late nineteenth century. Their 
struggle for the reduction of working hours went hand-in-hand with growing concern 
over how workers should best spend their leisure time, and worries over the impact of 
commercial entertainment.
52
 Evidently, the anxieties surrounding popular culture 
encountered in socialist Yugoslavia were feeding on a long tradition of cultural fears 
associated with the rise of mass society, consumerism and modernity, and marked 
post-Cold War cultural policies and discourses about culture in both in the East and 
the West.  
 
Substance over form. The binary of entertainment and education was closely 
intertwined with another key distinction underpinning the journalistic writing about 
culture in the Yugoslav northwest, namely the distinction between ‘substance’ and 
‘form’. As with other aspects of journalistic discourse about culture discussed so far, 
this feature echoed debates in the Soviet Union in the post-revolutionary period
53
 and 
had parallels with debates about culture elsewhere in the Eastern block at the time.
54
 
Yugoslav art critics were frequently warning against ‘purely formal beauty’, ‘art for 
art’s sake’ and ‘ideologically empty art’, presenting them as remnants of the ‘old’, 
‘bourgeois’ culture that distracted the masses from real social problems and rational 
explanations and solutions. Due to this, argued various authors, ideological substance 
should be treated as decisive when evaluating a work of art. A characteristic example 
can be found in a commentary published on the cover page of La Voce del Popolo, 
written by Eros Sequi, the first secretary of the Union of Italians. In his view, people 
should be prepared to compromise on the ‘external aspects’ of culture, and keep in 
mind that ‘external beauty can only be established once one has assured a progressive 
substance’. Only songs, poetry and scenes related to ‘actual problems’, even if 
‘deficient in artistic form’, argued Sequi, will have the capacity to educate the masses 
and teach them how to enjoy art for its ideological substance rather than merely 
artistic form.
55
  
 
The distinction between substance and form was repeatedly drawn upon in articles 
about various cultural activities in the region, and positive assessments typically 
referred to correct ideological content. The already mentioned report on the cultural 
youth festival organized in the Istrian village of Buje commended the participants for 
staging ‘good plays’, and as evident from their titles, a prime criterion was the 
inclusion of socialist ideas or motives from the Yugoslav partisan struggle during 
World War Two. One such play, entitled The Hotel of the Past, was praised for 
revealing ‘the deception, exploitation and inhospitality in hotels of the past’, and 
implicitly suggesting that the Yugoslav hotels of the future will be fairer to both their 
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employees and guests.
56
 Following similar criteria, a review of cultural events 
organized by the local labor unions disappointedly commented on the ‘ideological 
emptiness’ of some of the events, and listed several theatre plays that would have 
allegedly better served the purpose of education and mobilization.
57
  
 
The contrast between ideological emptiness and progressive substance was used also 
to demarcate the ‘new’ Yugoslav culture in spatial, geo-cultural terms. The exemplary 
models of cultural products and activities that paid due attention to ‘substance’ were 
often found in the Soviet Union, while negative examples of ‘formalistic’ culture 
were associated primarily with ‘the West’. In an article about Soviet culture translated 
from the Soviet daily Pravda, Western culture and civilization were described as 
‘superficial’, hiding a ‘spiritual poverty of contemporary imperialists and their 
followers’. In contrast, Soviet culture allegedly ‘arose from and blossoms on the basis 
of a genuine democracy, brotherly friendship of equal nations’, and now ‘provides the 
rallying point for all the progressive forces of the world’.58 Differences between 
Yugoslav and Italian culture were scrutinized through the same normative lens. The 
article written by Eros Sequi is particularly revealing in this respect. In his view, 
Italians, including those living in Yugoslavia, were prone to a ‘misguided’, 
‘bourgeois’ and overly ‘formalistic’ treatment of art and culture, since their cultural 
capabilities were ‘most ruthlessly manipulated and made deviant by decades of 
Fascism’.59 This ‘deviant’ culture was seen not only as an integral element of ‘the old 
society’ dominating in neighboring Italy, but also as ‘the secret weapon of 
imperialism’ operating from within the socialist Yugoslav state itself, and hampering 
its progress. In contrast, local inhabitants of Slavic descent were considered to be 
‘much more open to re-education’, since their cultural sensibilities have allegedly not 
been contaminated by the educational system of Fascist Italy.
60
  
 
Yet again, we see how the binary of ‘form’ and ‘substance’ was used to legitimize 
some cultural endeavors and discredit others, thereby establishing a hierarchy of 
cultural products and events within the Yugoslav northwest itself as well as promoting 
the superiority of Yugoslav culture internationally and historically. As with the binary 
pairs of categories discussed earlier, these hierarchical distinctions drew a symbolic 
map of the world that had its own powerful effects, but can hardly serve as an 
accurate guide to general cultural values and production at the time, let alone their 
historical roots. During the early Cold War, assaults on formalism had many 
proponents among the intellectual Left in Western Europe and were not necessarily 
accompanied by a wholesale rejection of modernism or by commitment to socialist 
realist art.
61
 The general population in the United States was also not particularly 
enthusiastic about modernist abstractions and stylistic innovation in poetry and prose, 
despite the fact that avant-garde art often promoted internationally as a defining 
feature of ‘American’ art.62  
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Culture for the masses. The final notable feature of the journalistic framing of culture 
n the Yugoslav northwest in the immediate post-war years was its endorsement of the 
mass character of culture. The new Yugoslav culture was expected to extend its 
appeal well beyond the educated elites and thereby contribute to the erasure of class 
boundaries. Writers, poets and intellectuals were requested to dedicate their work to 
the working people and serve their interests and needs. Yugoslavia was to be a 
country in which culture addressed the genuine needs of the working masses, in which 
the qualitative distinction between elite and mass culture was abolished, and in which 
high-quality culture was produced and enjoyed at a mass scale. An article written by a 
prominent Croatian language teacher, journalist and writer proudly announced that 
Yugoslavia was ‘a country of new culture, in which a book is not a good produced for 
the market, but […] an integral part of working people’s life’.63 Not all of the cultural 
products and activities at the time, however, were equally successful at attracting 
mass participation, and much of the reporting on cultural activities was dedicated to 
criticizing particular events and activities for failing to live up to the new cultural 
ideals. For example, an article evaluating the cultural-educational activities in the city 
of Rijeka and its surroundings criticized the organizers for their failure to establish 
strong ties with mass organizations and achieve greater popular appeal.
64
 The already 
discussed article detailing the work plan of the theatre in Rijeka was marked by the 
same normative assumptions about the role of culture, emphasizing the efforts to 
‘massify the theatre’ and ‘turn the whole nation into a theatre audience’ by 
introducing season tickets for labor union members.
65
 
 
As with other aspects of the journalistic understanding of Yugoslav culture, mass 
appeal served not only to define the ‘new’ Yugoslav culture from within, but also 
played a key role in distinguishing it from Italian and more broadly ‘Western’ culture. 
While the articles acknowledged that Italian culture is highly developed, they were 
also pointing out that the ability to appreciate and enjoy it was limited to the wealthy, 
educated elites rather than being democratically available to its whole population, 
including the working classes. The aforementioned article discussing the work plan of 
the local theatre contrasted the strategies for massification adopted by the theatre with 
the situation under Italian rule, when the authorities ‘calculatedly diverted the 
working people from theatre, deliberately entertaining them with light comedies […] 
in order to distract them from political and social problems’.66 In contrast, the Soviet 
Union was presented as a shining example of the growing ‘massification’ of culture, 
exemplified in the mushrooming of cultural institutions and activities that made 
culture available to the masses. An article translated from Pravda, which depicted the 
cultural and educational achievements of the Soviet Union since the revolution, also 
included details about the number of new theatres and schools built and books issued 
since the revolution, and boasted about the rising educational level of the general 
population.
67
 A similar quantitative approach to measuring cultural development was 
employed when assessing the cultural progress of Yugoslavia. Occasionally, 
newspapers published lists with exact numbers of books issued, new magazines and 
newspapers established, or libraries built since the formation of the ‘new’ Yugoslavia.  
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These clear-cut distinctions again obscure continuities with the past and neglect 
structural similarities in cultural practices and values on both sides of the Iron Curtain. 
Although ideas about the desirable content of culture varied greatly, being able to 
provide culture for the masses was a goal pursued by intellectuals and politicians on 
both sides of Cold War divide, at least in the early post-war years.
68
 In the United 
States, modern means of mass communication in particular were believed to 
constitute a powerful instrument of cultural development and modernization. For 
many American social scientists and UNESCO officials at the time, the media were 
‘great multipliers’, capable of increasing the amount of information people can send 
and receive to unimaginable scales, and thereby speeding up processes of social and 
economic change in even the most remote backwaters of the world.
69
 The habit of 
assessing development by means of quantitatively measuring the proliferation of mass 
culture was also not unique to the Eastern block. Literacy rates, newspaper 
circulation, cinema seats and radio receivers per capita were all indicators widely 
adopted in post-war American studies of modernization and development.
70
 Nor were 
these attitudes to, and uses of, mass culture limited to the post-war period. In the 1920 
and the 1930s, meanings associated with the masses in both the Soviet Union and the 
United States were largely positive, and in both countries, mass culture, in particular 
cinema, played a key role in promoting official, utopian visions of the present and 
future.
71
 The same applies to the history of ‘culture counting’ that became widespread 
across Europe already in the nineteenth century,
72
 as modern states started perceiving 
themselves as responsible for the cultural education of their populations. 
 
Conclusions  
 
In sum, the normative distinctions permeating the journalistic writings about culture 
in the northwest of Yugoslavia in the post-war years served a number of distinct ends, 
all of which were intimately linked to the production of a sense of a Yugoslav self and 
its internal and external others. On the one hand, the Cold War binaries helped 
legitimize the authority of cultural institutions and the communist authorities at large, 
as well as served to establish hierarchical relationships between cultural products, 
events and forms produced by local institutions, groups and individuals. On the other 
hand, they were also instrumental in situating the here and now of Yugoslav culture 
vis-à-vis the then and there of its pre-war past and Western capitalism. As pointed out 
throughout the chapter, the normative distinctions drawn by the media provide a 
rather poor guide to the actual reality of cultural practices, values and products both 
within and beyond Yugoslavia. Above all, they downplay the similarities between 
perceptions of culture on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and neglect their shared roots 
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that stem from the cultural norms, attitudes and practices established already in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Nevertheless, this mismatch between cultural dreamworlds and realities should not 
lead us to discount the Cold War binaries as entirely irrelevant to our understanding of 
the cultural history of this period. However far from reality they were, the cultural 
dreamworlds of the Cold War provided the ideological blueprints of institutional 
forms and practices, which in turn endowed them with the power to mould reality in 
their own image, and brush over those aspects that did not quite fit the picture. 
Understanding the logic of these institutionally supported dreamscapes can therefore 
help explain why so many people were willing to overlook the gap that separated 
these idealistic visions from the reality they lived in. Arguably, explaining this state of 
oblivion, be it willful or not, is just as vital to our understanding of Cold War history 
as the investigation of the various ways in which social actors may have resisted, 
ignored or otherwise ‘made do’ with or indeed eschewed the logic of Cold War 
rhetoric. Without that, we are running the risk of reducing our account of really 
existing socialisms to one that contrasts official imposition with popular resistance, 
repression with dissidence, and as such – though perhaps well attuned to 
contemporary political interests and divided memories of the period – has little to do 
with the actual logic and power of socialist dreams and nightmares.  
